Abstract. We introduce the notion of predicate encodings, an information-theoretic primitive reminiscent of linear secret-sharing that in addition, satisfies a novel notion of reusability. Using this notion, we obtain a unifying framework for adaptively-secure public-index predicate encryption schemes for a large class of predicates. Our framework relies on Waters' dual system encryption methodology (Crypto '09), and encompass the identity-based encryption scheme of Lewko and Waters (TCC '10), and the attribute-based encryption scheme of Lewko et al. (Eurocrypt '10). In addition, we obtain several concrete improvements over prior works. Our work offers a novel interpretation of dual system encryption as a methodology for amplifying a one-time private-key primitive (i.e. predicate encodings) into a many-time public-key primitive (i.e. predicate encryption).
Introduction
of our framework is a notion of predicate encodings. Roughly speaking, predicate encodings are an information-theoretic primitive reminiscent of secret-sharing schemes that in addition, satisfies a novel notion of reusability. Using predicate encodings, we obtain new insights into the dual system encryption methodology and new concrete predicate encryption schemes. Before we describe our results, we present an overview of predicate encodings.
Predicate encodings.
A predicate encoding for a Boolean predicate P(·, · ), is specified by a pair of algorithms (sE, rE) with a common private input w and in addition, -sender encoding sE takes as input (x, w) and outputs sE(x, w).
-receiver encoding rE takes as input (α, y, w) and randomness r , and outputs rE(α, y, w; r ).
The basic requirements for α are the same as that for secret-sharing:
(reconstruction.) if P(x, y) = 1, we can recover α from the encodings; (privacy.) if P(x, y) = 0, the encodings hide α perfectly.
The key conceptual novelty in predicate encoding (over other existing notions e.g. [45, 4, 20, 28, 24, 29, 1] ) which enables us to handle collusions in predicate encryption is w-hiding. Informally, w-hiding stipulates that we can hide all information about w in the receiver encoding by setting the randomness r to some fixed value (e.g. we can hide w in the expression r w by setting r to 0). Note that the definition of w-hiding treat w and r differently. Finally, we impose some algebraic structure in the encodings similar to that for linear secret-sharing, in order to carry out encoding and reconstruction "in the exponent" in the encryption scheme.
We stress that the requirements for predicate encodings are fairly basic and indeed, we readily obtain predicate encodings for a large class of predicates like HIBE, doubly spatial encryption and ABE, many of which are implicit in prior selectively secure schemes [7, 11, 9] . Moreover, privacy for these encodings follows readily from linear algebra, as is typically the case for information-theoretic primitives and constructions. On the other hand, the encodings in [26, 3] do not satisfying our requirements (c.f. Section 5.5); this provides a partial explanation as to why the Lewko-Waters heuristic [33] cannot be applied to these schemes.
Predicate encryption from predicate encodings. Starting from a predicate encoding for P, we construct a predicate encryption scheme in composite-order bilinear groups whose order is the product of three primes p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , and establish adaptive security in a modular manner via Waters' dual system encryption methodology. Here, a secret key sk y can decrypt a ciphertext ct x iff P(x, y) = 1. We associate ciphertext with sender encoding and secret keys with receiver encodings. Correctness will rely on the reconstruction property modulo p 1 , whereas security against collusions will rely on privacy and whiding modulo p 2 . The third subgroup corresponding to p 3 is used for additional randomization which we ignore in this overview. Roughly speaking, the master public key, secret key and ciphertext are of the form:
where g 1 is a generator of order p 1 . Observe that the lengths of w, sE and rE correspond naturally to the sizes of the public parameters, ciphertexts and secret keys. If P(x, y) = 1, decryption works by reconstructing α from sE(x, w) and rE(α, y, w; r ) in the exponent via a pairing.
Proof strategy. We outline the key challenges in establishing adaptive security of the predicate encryption scheme, which yields new insights into dual system encryption methodology:
-First, predicate encoding is essentially a private-key primitive, in that α-privacy against an adversary that does not see the shared randomness w, whereas w must be made public in order that encryption uses the same w as that used for decryption. The scheme overcomes this conundrum by publishing only g w 1 in the public parameters. This leaks information about w (mod p 1 ) so that we can exploit α-reconstruction modulo p 1 , but completely hides w (mod p 2 ) so that α-privacy holds modulo p 2 . In the final step in the hybrid security proof, the message is masked by α modulo p 2 whereas the public parameters and all secret keys reveal no information about α modulo p 2 . Security then follows via a simple information-theoretic argument.
-Second, predicate encoding only provides one-time security, that is, α-privacy no longer holds if we use w across more than one receiver encoding, as will be the case when an adversary requests multiple secret keys. We overcome this difficulty by ensuring that in each step in the proof of security, at most one secret key leaks information about w (mod p 2 ). In particular, both normal and semi-functional keys reveals no information about w (mod p 2 ). We only leak information about w (mod p 2 ) when transitioning from a normal to a semi-functional key, one key at a time. During the transition, we rely on w-hiding to "erase" information about w (mod p 2 ) from all remaining keys (see Fig 2 and Lemma 3).
-Finally, predicate encoding only provides non-adaptive security, namely α-privacy only holds if x, y are fixed in advance. On the other hand, an adversary may choose a key query y after seeing the challenge ciphertext for x, which leaks rE(x, w, r ). This is where we rely crucially on the fact that the encoding achieves perfect α-privacy, for which non-adaptive implies adaptive privacy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this requirement is explicitly pointed out for use in dual system encryption. (A recent work [6] highlights several subtleties in defining and achieving adaptive privacy in the related setting of garbled circuits.)
In short, dual system encryption allows us to boost security in a private-key, one-time, non-adaptive setting to a full-fledged public-key, many-time, adaptive setting! Along the way, we introduce a conceptual simplification where we define the semi-functional entities via auxiliary algorithms, reminiscent of Cramer-Shoup projective hashing [19] .
Instantiations. Our final predicate encryption scheme is adaptively secure under the standard Subgroup Decision Assumptions in composite order bilinear groups. We note that our implementation of the dual system encryption methodology differs in subtle ways from prior composite-order instantiations in [33, 36] (see e.g. Remark 2). In addition to a unifying proof of security for a large class of predicates, we obtain the several concrete improvements over prior works:
-We eliminate the need for an additional computational assumption which refers to the target group, as used in the prior composite-order HIBE and ABE [33, 36] . In particular, we show how to execute the final transition in the proof of security with an information-theoretic argument instead of a computational one.
-We reduce the key size of the (key-policy) ABE in [36] by half. The improvement comes from eliminating some redundant randomization in the associated encoding.
-We obtain novel (to the best of our knowledge) and simple constructions of adaptively-secure nonzero inner product encryption and doubly spatial encryption in composite-order bilinear groups.
Discussion
Predicate encodings decouple and modularize the essential information-theoretic properties from the broader mechanics of a dual system cryptosystem and its analysis. Previous dual-system proofs are often monolithic and hard to follow, and the core new ideas are sometimes buried underneath lots of algebraic notation that is repeated (or only slightly tweaked) from one scheme to another. Our framework allows us to distill the core argument that is common to dual system cryptosystems from a separate informationtheoretic argument which is tailored to the underlying predicate.
Open problems. This work raises a number of open problems.
-Do bilinear (or multi-linear) predicate encodings exist for all polynomial-time computable predicates? An affirmative answer would yield adaptively secure ABE for circuits [25, 21] , without relying on complexity leveraging. However, even achieving perfect α-hiding without the bilinear requirements would likely require overcoming long-standing barriers.
-Can we prove lower bounds on the length of w, rE or sE for predicate encodings (corresponding to public parameters, secret keys and ciphertext sizes respectively)? In particular, the encodings for ABE require that rE grows with the size of the formula (c.f. Section 5.5) and we conjecture that such a dependency is in fact necessary for perfect α-privacy.
-Finally, we note that our work does not cover more recent applications of dual system encryption in the computational setting for ABE with short ciphertexts [35] . There, α-privacy is computational, for which we no longer get adaptive from non-adaptive security "for free". We leave these extensions for future work.
Subsequent work.
In subsequent works [15, 16] , we built upon the ideas introduced here in several ways.
In [15] , we introduced dual system groups, a step towards abstracting the underlying group structure needed to support the dual system encryption methodology. This is orthogonal and complementary to this work, which is about abstracting how we encode the predicate/functionality. In [16] , we presented the first adaptively secure IBE where the security loss does not depend on the number of secret key queries, partially resolving an open problem in [43, 22] . The crucial insight lies in replacing the onetime predicate encoding for IBE (a randomized MAC) with a reusable one (a pseudorandom function). Specifically, we rely on dual system encryption methodology to "compile" the Naor-Reingold PRF [38] which is a private-key primitive into a fully secure IBE.
Organization. We formalize predicate encodings in Section 3. We present the generic construction of a predicate encryption scheme in Section 4. We describe instantiations of predicate encodings in Section 5. Preliminaries are given in Section 2.
Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by s ← R S the fact that s is picked uniformly at random from a finite set S. By PPT, we denote a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Throughout, we use 1 λ as the security parameter.
We use · to denote multiplication as well as component-wise multiplication. We use lower case boldface to denote (column) vectors over scalars and upper case boldcase to denote vectors of group elements as well as matrices. Given two vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .), y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) over scalars, we use 〈x, y〉 to denote the standard dot product x ⊤ y. Given a group element g , we write g x to denote (g x 1 , g x 2 , . . .).
Composite Order Bilinear Groups and Cryptographic Assumptions
We instantiate our system in composite order bilinear groups, which were introduced in [12] and used in [31, 33, 36] . A generator G takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a description
where N is product of distinct primes of Θ(λ) bits, G and G T are cyclic groups of order N , and e : G ×G → G T is a non-degenerate bilinear map. We require that the group operations in G and G T as well the bilinear map e are computable in deterministic polynomial time.We consider bilinear groups G whose orders N are products of three distinct primes Cryptographic assumptions. Our construction relies on the following two assumptions which are essentially the first two of three assumptions used in [33, 36] and are instances of the General Subgroup Decision Assumption in composite-order groups [5] . We define the following two advantage functions:
Assumption 1 (resp. 2) asserts that for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv
Predicate Encryption
We define predicate encryption in the framework of key encapsulation. A predicate encryption scheme for a predicate P(·, · ) consists of four algorithms (Setup, Enc,KeyGen,Dec):
The setup algorithm gets as input the security parameter λ, the attribute universe X, the predicate universe Y and outputs the public parameter (pp, mpk), and the master key msk. All the other algorithms get pp as part of its input.
The encryption algorithm gets as input mpk and an attribute x ∈ X. It outputs a ciphertext ct x and a symmetric key κ ∈ {0, 1} λ . Note that x is public given ct x .
KeyGen(msk, y) → sk y . The key generation algorithm gets as input msk and a value y ∈ Y. It outputs a secret key sk y . Note that y is public given sk y .
Dec(sk y , ct x ) → κ. The decryption algorithm gets as input sk y and ct x such that P(x, y) = 1. It outputs a symmetric key κ.
where the probability is taken over (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 λ , X,Y) and the coins of Enc.
Security definition. For a stateful adversary A, we define the advantage function
with the restriction that all queries y that A makes to KeyGen(msk,·) satisfies P(x, y) = 0 (that is, sk y does not decrypt ct x ). A predicate encryption scheme is adaptively secure if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv PE A (λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Bilinear Predicate Encodings
In this section, we describe predicate encodings more formally. Then, we discuss several examples, before describing the bilinear requirement.
Predicate encodings
Fix a predicate P : X × Y → {0, 1}. A predicate encoding for P is a pair of algorithms (sE, rE), where sE is deterministic and takes as input (x, w) ∈ X × W; and rE is randomized and takes as input (α, y, w) ∈ D × Y × W and randomness r ∈ R. (We stress that W and R play very different roles, as evident in the w-hiding property.) In addition, we require that (sE, rE) satisfy the following three properties:
(α-reconstruction.) For all (x, y) ∈ X × Y such that P(x, y) = 1 and for all r , we can (efficiently) recover α given x, y, sE(x, w), rE(α, y, w; r ).
(α-privacy.) For all (x, y) ∈ X × Y such that P(x, y) = 0, and for all α ∈ D, the joint distribution sE(x, w), rE(α, y, w; r ) perfectly hides α. That is, for all α, α ′ ∈ D, the following joint distributions are
{x, y, α, sE(x, w), rE(α, y, w; r )} and {x, y, α, sE(x, w), rE(α ′ , y, w; r )} where the randomness is taken over (w, r ) ← R W × R.
(w-hiding.) There exists some element 0 ∈ R such that for all (α, y, w) ∈ D× ∈ Y × W, rE(α, y, w; 0) is statistically independent of w, that is, for all w
rE(α, y, w; 0) = rE(α, y, w
Remark 1. We rely crucially on the fact that α is perfectly hidden in the proof of security, so that nonadaptive indistinguishability implies adaptive indistinguishability. (This is not true in the statistical or computational setting.) Concretely, we claim that α-privacy implies that even if y is chosen adaptively after seeing (x, α, rE(x, w)), the distributions rE(α, y, w; r ) and rE(0, y, w; r ) are perfectly indistinguishable. This simply follows from the fact that an adaptive distinguisher with advantage ϵ can be converted into a non-adaptive distinguisher with advantage ϵ/|Y| via random guessing. Since any non-adaptive distinguisher has advantage 0, we must have ϵ = 0 to begin with. The same argument applies to the setting where x is chosen adaptively after seeing (y, α, rE(·, y, w; r )).
Remark 2.
We note that w-hiding as defined is not the only way to achieve "w-reusability". For instance, for the equality predicate as in IBE, the Lewko-Waters scheme [33] achieves reusability by essentially masking rE(α, y, w; r ) with a fresh one-time pad for each secret key query. This works for IBE and HIBE because rE(α, y, w; r ) has the uniform distribution for every y. However, this approach does not work for the ABE predicate. Indeed, by using w-hiding, we obtain a different proof of security of the Lewko-Waters HIBE.
Example 1: equality. Fix an integer N to be the product of three λ-bit primes. Consider the equality predicate where X = Y = [N ] and P(x, y) = 1 iff x = y. The following is a predicate encoding for equality used in [7, 33] : This still satisfies α-reconstruction and α-privacy, but not w-hiding nor linear receiver encoding (the latter property is defined in the next Section).
Bilinearity
Fix a prime p. Let (sE, rE) be a predicate encoding for P : X × Y → {0, 1}, where X and Y may depend on p. We say that (sE, rE) is p-bilinear if it satisfies the following properties:
(output domains.) The output of sE and rE are (column) vectors over Z p .
(affine sender encoding.) For all x ∈ X, sE(x, · ) is affine in w. 
Remark 3.
We will exploit the affine sender encoding and linear receiver encoding to compute sE and rE "in the exponent". Fix g ∈ G N .
-Affine sender encoding implies that given x ∈ X along with g , g w , we can compute g sE(x,w) ; indeed, we will slightly abuse notation and write this as sE(x, g w ).
-Similarly, linear receiver encoding implies that given (y, w) ∈ Y × W along with g α , g r (but not g ), we
can compute g rE(α,y,w;r) ; again, we will write this as rE(g α , y, w; g r ).
Extensions. We also consider two extensions, first to handle randomized sender's encoding in Section 5.5 and second to support delegation in Section 5.3.
Predicate Encryption from Bilinear Encoding
We present a predicate encryption scheme in composite-order bilinear groups whose order is the product of three primes (c.f. Section 2.1), for any predicate P(·,·) which admits a bilinear predicate encoding. In addition, we show that the scheme is adaptively secure under the General Subgroup Decision Assumption. We refer to Section 1.1 for an overview of the construction and the proof. 3 The distinction between Z p and Z * p is significant because we require perfect α-privacy. 4 This is in fact a slight relaxation of the general w-hiding property since 0 does not lie in R whenever ℓ ′ R > 0. 
Construction
Fix a predicate P : X × Y → {0, 1}. Given a N -bilinear predicate encoding (sE, rE) for P, we may construct a predicate encryption scheme for P as follows:
λ from a family of pairwise-independent hash functions. In addition, sample α ← R Z N , w ← R W, and output 
Enc(mpk, x):
On input an attribute x ∈ X, sample s ← R Z N and output the ciphertext and symmetric key
Dec(sk y , ct x ): On input sk y and ct x where P(x, y) = 1, output
where M x y is the matrix for bilinear reconstruction and e(ct x , sk
). 5 If we want to be able to derive multiple (mpk, msk) from the same pp, we will need to append a random generator of G {1,2}
to pp, which we can then use to sample msk. Note that this will not affect the proof of security, since such a generator is provided to the distinguisher in both Assumption 1 and 2.
Correctness. For all (x, y) ∈ X × Y such that P(x, y) = 1, we have g 1 , g 1 ) α ) s )
Proof of security
We prove the following theorem: 
The proof follows via a series of games, outlined in Section 1.1 and summarized in Fig 2. Following Waters' dual system encryption metholodogy [44] , there are two types of keys and ciphertexts: normal and semi-functional. We first describe two auxiliary algorithms (analogous to "private evaluation" algorithms in Cramer-Shoup projective hashing [19] ), and then defining the semi-functional distributions via these auxiliary algorithms.
Auxiliary algorithms. We consider the following algorithms: a deterministic algorithm Enc for computing ciphertexts and a randomized algorithm KeyGen for computing secret keys.
Enc(pp, x; msk ′ ,C ): On input x ∈ X, along with msk ′ = (h, w) ∈ G N × W and C ∈ G N , output:
Observe that for all (pp, mpk, msk) output by Setup and for all s ∈ Z N , we have
KeyGen(msk That is, we have three different but equivalent ways to generate real secret keys. The equivalence of the first two distributions is straight-forward. For the equivalence of the second and the third, we use the fact that R is of the form Z
ℓ ′ R and that we randomize using rand3. , where we drew a box to highlight the differences between each game and the preceding one, and games 2.i .xx refer to the i 'th secret key.
Auxiliary distributions. We consider the following auxiliary distributions for ciphertext and secret keys, where (pp, mpk, msk, α, w) are sampled as in Setup.
-semi-functional (SF) master secret key: msk = ( g α Game sequence. We present a series of games. We write Adv xx to denote the advantage of A in Game xx .
-Game 0 : is the real security game (c.f. Section 2.2).
-Game 1 : is the same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. We also modify the distribution of κ 0 accordingly.
-Game 2,i for i = 1, . . . , q: is the same as Game 1 , except the first i − 1 keys are semi-functional, and the last q − i keys are normal. There are 4 sub-games, where the i 'th key transitions from normal in Game 2.i .0 , to pseudo-normal in Game 2.i .1 , to pseudo-SF in Game 2.i .2 , to SF in Game 2.i .3 .
-Game 3 : is the same as Game 2,q,3 , except that κ 0 ← R {0, 1}
λ .
In Game 3 , the view of the adversary A is statistically independent of the challenge bit β. Hence, Adv 3 = 0.
We complete the proof by establishing the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (normal to semi-functional ciphertexts).
There exists A 1 whose running time is roughly that of A such that
Proof. We will rely on Assumption 1. ).
Key Queries. On input the j 'th key query y j , output
Output. Output whatever A outputs.
Observe that when T = T 0 ← R G p 1 , the output is identical to that in Game 0, and when
the output is identical to that in Game 1.
⊓ ⊔

Lemma 2 (normal to pseudo-normal secret keys).
There exists A 2 whose running time is roughly that of A such that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , q,
Proof. We will rely on Assumption 2. On input 
Proof. We will again rely on Assumption 2. The proof is completely analogous to Lemma 2, except A 3 uses msk instead of msk to sample sk y j .That is, A 3 outputs
Observe that when
G p 3 , the output is identical to that in Game 2.i .2, and when
G p 3 , the output is identical to that in Game 2.i .3.
⊓ ⊔
Lemma 5 (final transition).
Proof. In Game 3.q.3, all the secret keys are semi-functional, which means they leak no information whatsoever about α (mod p 2 ). Next, let us examine the (semi-functional) challenge ciphertext. Observe that the quantity (from which the symmetric key κ 0 is derived)
has log p 2 = Θ(λ) bits of min-entropy as long as
, which occurs with probability 1 − 1/p 2 .
Then, by the left-over hash lemma,
) is 2 −Ω(λ) -close to the uniform distribution over {0, 1} λ . The claim follows readily. ⊓ ⊔
Instantiations of Predicate Encodings
We present N -bilinear predicate encodings for a large class of predicates that have been considered in the literature. For concreteness, think of N as the order of the composite-order bilinear group. Note that in the proof of α-privacy, whenever we compute some value v ̸ = 0 ∈ Z N , we will simply assume that gcd(v, N ) = 1; otherwise, we will be able to compute a non-trivial factor of N . Instantiated via our framework, we obtain the adaptively-secure composite-order (H)IBE, ABE and spatial encryption schemes in [33, 36, 14] . In addition, we obtain novel (to the best of our knowledge) and simple constructions of adaptively-secure NIPE and doubly spatial encryption.
Inner Product (IPE)
Predicate [31] . Here, X = Y := Z The constructions exploit the following simple algebraic fact: given x, y, u 0 x + u, 〈y, w〉, -if 〈x, y〉 ̸ = 0, then we can recover u 0 .
-if 〈x, y〉 = 0, then u 0 is perfectly random.
First encoding (short ciphertext).
-sE(x,w) := (〈w, x〉, 1)
-rE(α,y,w;r ) := (r, αy − r w) Second encoding (short secret keys).
-sE(x,(u 0 , u)) := (u 0 x + u, 1)
-rE(α,y,(u 0 , u); r ) := (r, α + u 0 r, r 〈u, y〉)
Spatial Encryption
Predicate [9] . Here,
Recall from [9] that spatial encryption generalizes HIBE.
Supporting delegation. Consider a predicate P that supports delegation, namely, there is a partial ordering ≤ on Y such that for all x ∈ X, the predicate P(x,·) is monotone, i.e.
(y ≤ y
For instance, in HIBE, y ≤ y ′ iff y ′ is a prefix of y. A bilinear encoding (sE, rE) for such a predicate supports delegation if given y, y ′ such that y ≤ y ′ , we can efficiently compute a linear map L such that for all (α, w, r) ∈ D × W × R, L maps (w, rE(α, y ′ , w; r)) to rE(α, y, w; r). Note that we can always rerandomize the output due to linearity of receiver encoding.
Encoding (short ciphertext) [9, 11, 33, 14]. 
Doubly Spatial Encryption
Predicate [27] . Here, 
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)
We define (monotone) access structures using the language of (monotone) span programs [30] . ω j M j = 1.
Observe that the constants {ω j } can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M via Gaussian elimination. In the prior construction [36] , rE is given by (α 1 − r 1 w ρ(1) , . . . , α ℓ − r ℓ w ρ(ℓ) , r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ).
KP-ABE Predicate
Here, α-privacy holds for all r ∈ Z * N , and relies crucially on the fact that ρ is injective.
Remark 5 (GPSW encoding [26] ). It is instructive here to revisit the encoding used in the selective ABE in [26] where rE is given by (α 1 /w ρ(1) , . . . , α ℓ /w ρ(ℓ) ).
This implies α-privacy but only in a statistical sense (the encoding only hides non-zero shares). Moreover, it does not satisfy w-hiding.
CP-ABE Predicate [26, 17] . As before with X and Y switched, so that P((M,ρ),y) = 1 iff y satisfies (M, ρ)
Encoding. In the following encoding, we allow sE to be randomized: Randomized sender encodings. We may handle the extension to randomized sender encodings where sE takes additional randomness u as follows:
-the requirement for α-privacy holds over random coin tosses of sE;
-affine sending encoding says that we can compute g sE(x,w) given g w , x and the coin tosses used in sE;
-we extend the definition of Enc and Enc to use randomized sE in a straight-forward manner;
-the proof remains largely unchanged except for accounting for sender randomness when invoking α-privacy in the proof of Lemma 3.
